Letter to Investors – Jun’25 – Extracts

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

    • Trailing twelve months’ earnings of underlying portfolio companies grew by 13.4%.
    • NAV grew by 14.8% YTD with 80% funds invested in equity positions. Balance 20% is parked in liquid/ arbitrage funds.
    • Controlling risk through “one durable variable businesses (1DVB)”.
    • Portfolio changes: we added to three existing positions and exited from one. 
    • Mistake: Music Broadcast arbitrage position (loss of 0.5% of AUM).
    • Investing is an inexact science and this creates unique challenges.
    • Stance: Neutral

Dear Fellow Investors, 

Controlling Risk through ‘One Durable Variable Businesses (1DVB)’

Our preferred way to manage investment and portfolio risk is to buy and hold businesses that are:

  1. Easier to value with reasonable confidence,
  2. Trading at or below their intrinsic worth, and
  3. Diversified across different drivers (i.e., low mutual correlation)

Today, we focus on the first and the enabling element: estimating the intrinsic worth of a business. If this is done well, the next two steps—buying at a discount and diversifying intelligently—become much more manageable.

 

What is Intrinsic Worth?

At its core, the intrinsic value of a business is the present value of all future free cash flows it will generate over its life (free cashflow means cash profits less business investments). While this definition is conceptually simple, its practical application is difficult—because it involves predicting the future. And the future, by nature, is uncertain and unknowable. So, how can we reliably estimate the future of a business?

 

The Idea of 1DVB

This is where, what we call, the concept of One Durable Variable Businesses (1DVB) becomes relevant. We define a 1DVB as a business where a single, durable variable is the primary driver of long-term free cash flows. 

 

One Variable

The litmus test of business-understanding is whether we can identify the key variables that drive its free cash flows. Examples of such variables include auto volumes, credit growth, new home construction, AUM (assets under management) etc. The fewer the number of variables, the lower the complexity, and the easier it becomes to build a mental model of the business. An ideal case is a business driven largely by a single dominant variable.

 

Durability

Singularity of driving variable is essential, but incomplete in itself. The second essential requirement is durability – ability to survive and thrive for long period of time. For it to be useful for forecasting, the key driver must be durable—meaning it should withstand disruption, competition, or regulatory shocks; and be well governed. Durability stems from three main sources:

  • Competitive advantage: Ability to fend off competitors and disruptions sustainably.
  • Stakeholder benefit: A business that benefits stakeholders is less likely to attract regulatory ire.
  • Governance: Efficient and shareholder-aligned management ensures the business steers clear of self-inflicted damage.

 

Examples of 1DVBs

Business Type Primary Variable Durability Source (for some companies)
Stock exchanges Transaction value Network effects (more users → more liquidity)
Mutual funds Assets under management Trust, distribution, low costs
Auto ancillaries Auto volume Switching costs, engine agnosticity, quality
Lenders Credit growth Underwriting culture, cost of funds, distribution
Capital goods Capex cycle Installed base, technological edge
Credit ratings Value of debt rated Regulatory license, track record, reputation

 

1DVBs as perpetual bonds

When a business has a single, durable cash flow driver, and we understand both the driver and its source of durability, the range of future outcomes narrows. The business becomes somewhat similar to a debt instrument —a predictable stream of cash flows, subject to less variability and disruption risk. This makes it possible to assign a more credible and stable estimate of intrinsic worth, reducing the chance of major valuation errors.

 

Factoring growth and cyclicality

While many businesses can share the 1DVB trait, their growth trajectories and cyclicality may differ.

  • Some will enjoy steady, structural growth (e.g., stock exchanges).
  • Others may be cyclical (e.g., capital goods, auto ancillaries), where demand ebbs and flows with macroeconomic cycles.

It’s important to distinguish cyclical upswings from sustainable growth. Mistaking the former for the latter is a common pitfall. Also, growth without durability is dangerous—it tempts overvaluation and underestimates risk.

 

Controlling risk with 1DVBs

In test cricket parlance, only when a batsman knows where his off stump is, can he decide whether to play or leave a swinging ball. In investing, that off stump is the intrinsic value of a business. 1DVBs allows for knowing where exactly the investing off stump (intrinsic value) is so that overpriced stocks can be left and only reasonably priced stocks are played. This lowers individual stock risk.

Secondly, by building a portfolio of such well bought 1DVBs driven by different underlying variables we can ensure that they don’t all falter or flourish at the same time, lowering portfolio risk.

A thoughtful portfolio of uncorrelated 1DVBs, bought at sensible prices, provides a strong foundation for long-term compounding with risk control. And till we find such constituents, it is okay to wait.

 

A. PERFORMANCE

 

A1. Statutory PMS Performance Disclosure

Year Ended CED Long Term Focused Value (PMS) BSE 500 TRI (Benchmark) Difference
Return Avg. Cash Eq. Bal. Return Trailing P/E
YTD FY26 14.8% 20.3% 10.8% 25.7x +4.0%
FY 2025 10.3% 21.0% 6.0% 23.4x +4.3%
FY 2024 29.2% 26.1% 40.2% 26.2x -11.0%
FY 2023 -4.3% 30.0% -0.9% 22.3x -3.4%
FY 2022 14.9% 38.5% 22.3% 25.0x -7.4%
FY 2021 48.5% 29.0% 78.6% 38.0x -30.1%
FY 2020* -9.5% 23.0% -23.4% 18.3x +13.9%
Since Inception(6Y) 16.0% 27.9% 18.4% -2.4%
*From Jul 24, 2019; Since inception performance is annualised; Note: As required by SEBI, the returns are calculated on time weighted average (NAV) basis. The returns are NET OF ALL EXPENSES AND FEES. The returns pertain to ENTIRE portfolio of our one and only strategy. Individual investor returns may vary from above owing to different investment dates. Annual returns are audited but not verified by SEBI.

 

Kindness of strangers

Typically, it takes five or more years for skill to show through in investing. But the past five have been unusual. Median valuations haven’t just stayed high—they’ve risen further, largely due to a surge in retail investor flows. Investing in such a market has felt like relying on the kindness of strangers—expecting ever-rising liquidity to drive prices higher, regardless of fundamentals.

We’ve preferred to anchor ourselves to what holds true over decades: valuation discipline. While liquidity trends are new and fickle, valuation mean reversion has stood the test of time. That belief led us to maintain an average 28% cash-equivalent reserve (liquid/ arbitrage funds) over the last five years, waiting for rightly priced opportunities.

This caution helped during the Sep’24–Feb’25 correction, when our portfolio held up well. It marked the first meaningful test in years—and we were prepared. We believe the next phase will reward discipline. As valuations revert toward long-term averages, we’re positioned not just for resilience, but to act decisively when true value emerges.

 

A2. Underlying business performance

 

Past Twelve Months Earnings per unit (EPU)2 FY 2025 EPU (expected)
Mar 2025 9.31 10.0-10.83
(guidance was –>) (8.5 – 9.5)
Dec 2024 (Previous Quarter) 9.2
Mar 2025 (Previous Year) 8.6
Annual Change 13.4%
CAGR since inception (Jun 2019) 14.8%
1 Last four quarters ending Mar 2025. Results of June quarter are declared by Aug only. 2 EPU = Total normalised earnings accruing to the aggregate portfolio divided by units outstanding. 3 Please note: the forward earnings per unit (EPU) are conservative estimates of our expectation of future earnings of underlying companies. In past we have been wrong – often by wide margin – in our estimates and there is a risk that we are wrong about the forward EPU reported to you above. 

 

Trailing Earnings: Earnings per unit for FY2025 came in at Rs 9.3 per share, within the range that we had expected at the start of the year (Rs 8.5-9.5 per share). This represents a growth 13.4% over last year. Since inception, earnings per unit, an indicator of earnings power of our underlying companies, has grown at 14.8%, marginally lower than our aspiration for 15%+ growth.

 

1-Yr Forward Earnings: We introduce FY26 forward earnings per unit guidance at Rs 10.0-10.8, an expected growth of 10%-16% over FY25.

 

A3. Underlying portfolio parameters

 

June 2025 Trailing P/E Forward P/E Portfolio RoIC Portfolio Turnover1
CED LTFV (PMS) 26.0x 22.4x-24.2x 34.0%3 11.2%
BSE 500 25.7x2 16.5%2
1 ‘sale of equity shares’ divided by ‘average portfolio value’ during the year to date period. 2Source: Asia Index. 3Portfolio Return on Invested Capital (RoIC) is on core equity positions. For BSE 500 index we share the RoE (Return on Equity)

 

B. DETAILS ON PERFORMANCE

B1. MISTAKES AND LEARNINGS

In our older portfolios, we exited the equity leg of an experimental arbitrage position in Music Broadcast Ltd. (aka Radio City) at a loss of 0.50% of AUM. While small in quantum, this position consumed time and mindshare disproportionate to its potential, and in hindsight, we classify it as a mistake.

We had initiated this arbitrage setup three years ago. The idea was to buy equity shares and receive bonus preference shares (issued only to non-promoter shareholders) — effectively a special dividend with better tax treatment. At the time, the implied dividend yield was 30% of market cap, but 40–48% for eligible non-promoter shareholders, offering a theoretical arbitrage of 10–18%.

Our plan was to exit the equity shares after the ex-date. However, instead of correcting ~30%, the stock price fell over 50%. We made the classic mistake of waiting for a recovery rather than cutting the position. Though we managed to exit a small part at higher levels, the stock declined further and remained depressed. As better opportunities emerged, we finally exited the remaining equity last quarter, incurring the loss.

The reason the stock fell far more than expected remains unclear. Normally, stocks adjust by the dividend amount post ex-date. In this case, the price correction was significantly steeper. The only plausible explanation seems to be the structural challenges of the underlying radio business, which may be facing long-term decline.

We continue to hold the preference shares — the other leg of the arbitrage — which cost us nothing and currently trade at ₹113, with a redemption value of ₹120 expected in eight months (an annualised return of 9.2%).

While the position was designed as a low-risk special situation, the outcome reminds us that arbitrage strategies in low-quality businesses can be value traps.

 

B2. MAJOR PORTFOLIO CHANGES

Bought: We added further to three of our existing positions. 

Sold: As mentioned in the earlier section, we have completely exited from Music Broadcast equity shares.

 

B4. FLOWS AND SENTIMENTS

Tariff announcements from the US continued to influence global and local markets. While the steep and irrational tariffs imposed by the US on its trading partners have been paused, the average tariffs are still much higher than modern history. Globalisation led to comparative advantage efficiencies, productivity and prosperity. Reversal of the same should lead to some side effects and pain. How countries will counter-respond to and how supply chains will adapt is complicated to forecast and therefore continues to remain the key source of global and Indian demand uncertainty.

Back home, pause in tariffs and ceasefire at border soothed Indian markets. After falling between 12-20% between September 2024 and February 2025, market indices recovered most of the losses. Defence stocks came back in limelight and despite poor earnings results moved up 50-70% indicating return of investor euphoria.

Retail investors, via mutual funds and IPOs, continue to provide mouthwatering exits to promoters and private equity investors (insiders). Mutual funds inflows remain positive though lesser than peak. Gross SIP flows crossed past peak to go past 26,000cr mark. IPO pipelines, a bull market sign, are full again.

Earnings performance has been weak with BSE 500 companies reporting a 5% and 7% rise in revenue and earnings. Yet the stock prices continued to build in much higher earnings growth indicating buoyant mood and expensive valuations.

Overall, the sentiments and flows are back to their past highs, requiring caution and restraint.

 

C. OTHER THOUGHTS

Investing – An Inexact Science

All generalisations, including this one, are false

-Mark Twain

We learn mainly through imitation and experience. We observe others, draw lessons from past events, and use pattern recognition to establish cause-and-effect relationships that guide our future actions.

  • A child learns to speak by mimicking their parents.
  • Early humans learned which berries were poisonous by watching others suffer—or die—after eating them.

Our minds try to extract rules from what we see and experience. This doesn’t stop at language or survival. It influences how we approach investing as well.

Most investors – us included – have at some point looked for a magic formula. Something neat and repeatable that can lead to assured success. After a strong bull run, investors often try to reverse-engineer success, identifying what worked and assuming it will work again. But markets are rarely that obliging.

Unlike natural sciences, investing is not an exact discipline. In physics or chemistry, repeating the same actions under the same conditions yields predictable outcomes. Investing, on the other hand, operates in a dynamic system driven by human psychology, collective behaviour, and ever-changing context. The same action, under seemingly similar circumstances, can lead to vastly different results.

For instance, investors have long believed that equities and gold move in opposite directions. Yet, in recent years, both asset classes have hit all-time highs simultaneously. Similarly, conventional wisdom holds that rising interest rates strengthen a currency, yet the US dollar has depreciated even as US interest rates have climbed. Past relationships, while useful, are not eternal truths. They can—and do—break.

Worse still, in markets, a successful idea often contains the seeds of its own undoing. Once a particular style or strategy proves effective, it attracts followers. As more participants crowd into the trade, the opportunity erodes. This is the paradox of popularity: the more widely something is followed, the less effective it becomes.

Take the oft-repeated advice: avoid low-quality businesses or overpriced stocks. Sensible advice, yet in the last few years, precisely these stocks have delivered stellar returns—defying expectations and frustrating fundamental investors. Why? Because markets are reflexive. They are shaped not just by fundamentals but by what people believe about fundamentals. If enough people believe an average business is a great one, and act on that belief, they can drive the stock price up—at least temporarily—validating the belief, even if the underlying reality hasn’t changed.

This is what makes investing uniquely hard: the absence of reliable guideposts. The past is an imperfect teacher. Relationships that held true in 90% of the past might fail precisely when you bet your house on them.

The only dependable math/ magic formula is that the value of business is the present value of its future free cash flows. While this gets violated from time to time, over longer term this has hold steadfast.

The imprecise nature of investing requires acting with conviction while also preparing for the possibility that the world may behave differently this time. This paradox—balancing belief with flexibility—is the true art of investing.

***

As always, gratitude for your trust and patience. Kindly do share your thoughts, if any. Your feedback helps us improve our services to you!

Kind regards

Sumit Sarda

Partner and Portfolio Manager

————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Disclaimer: Compound Everyday Capital Management LLP is SEBI registered Portfolio Manager with registration number INP 000006633. Past performance is not necessarily indicative of future results. All information provided herein is for informational purposes only and should not be deemed as a recommendation to buy or sell securities. This transmission is confidential and may not be redistributed without the express written consent of Compound Everyday Capital Management LLP and does not constitute an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to purchase any security or investment product. Reference to an index does not imply that the firm will achieve returns, volatility, or other results similar to the index.

 

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Letter to Investors – Dec’24 – Extracts

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

    • For the Dec’24 quarter, the BSE500 index reported a change of -7.8% including dividends. We reported -0.6%. 
    • Trailing twelve months’ earnings of underlying portfolio companies grew by 25%.
    • In an elevated market like current one, falling less might be more important than rising more.
    • Looking at our batting average and equity IRRs.
    • We introduced a new toehold position.
    • Stance: Cautious

Dear Fellow Investors,

Falling less > Rising more

 

Investment success is often celebrated through spectacular gains, but history and track record of great investors suggest that falling less is equally important. Focus on capital preservation and avoiding large drawdowns has higher probability of doing well than chasing high returns. This is all the more important in an elevated market like current one.

 

Mathematics of falling Less

20% annual returns for 6 years followed by -15% annual returns in next two years reduces the 8-year CAGR (compounded annual growth rate) to ~10%. Conversely, 12.5% annual returns for 6 years followed by 7.5% p.a. return in next two years leads to a CAGR of ~11%. The table below illustrates this:

Scenario CAGR

(Years 1-6)

CAGR

(Years 7-8)

8-Year CAGR
Portfolio 1: Steady growth, no drop 12.5% 7.5% 11.2%
Portfolio 2: High growth, then drop 19.9% -15.6% 9.8%

 

These are not imaginary portfolios. The first portfolio above is Nifty 50 index and the second portfolio is BSE Smallcap index. And the 8 years in question are CY2011-2019 (a full cycle). This is neither a praise of the former nor a critique of the latter and may not hold true in all periods and portfolios. But it is a good reference period for the largecap-smallcap divergence we are seeing today. This illustration underscores that buying price matters and valuations & returns tend to mean revert. 

Rising more + falling less?

It is tempting to imagine holding “Portfolio 2” during high growth years and switching to “Portfolio 1” before the downturn. While this strategy sounds appealing in hindsight, it’s difficult to execute in practice. A “rising more” approach is pro-cyclical, encouraging higher risk-taking in an already risky market. It works like magic when things are going well amassing praise, confidence and money. FOMO (fear of missing out) makes it difficult to let it go. Also, professional managers following “rising more” style set wrong expectations for incoming investors/ money and find it difficult to justify moving to an opposite strategy. Some, either due to luck or skill, may be able to straddle both styles. But for most, its either one or the other. 

Buy high, sell low

A “rising more” strategy can lead to challenges when fund inflows and outflows are unrestricted. Stellar bull-market performance attracts inflows at peak valuations, raising the probability of subpar future returns. Conversely, during market corrections, such strategies often face deeper drawdowns, prompting panicked investor exits at a loss. The 2011-2019 performance of smallcap indices exemplifies this phenomenon. Morningstar’s “Mind the Gap” study consistently finds that investor returns lag fund returns by 1-2% annually due to poor timing decisions, with the gap widening for more volatile strategies. Lower volatility in a “falling less” strategy reduces these risks, ensuring newer investors are not disadvantaged and minimizing the likelihood of buying high and selling low.

Balancing risk and return

A simple way to minimize losses could involve staying 100% in cash, earning a risk-free rate (currently 6-7% p.a.). However, risk avoidance leads to return avoidance too. Plus, timing market tops and bottoms credibly is nearly impossible. Hedging using options is another way. It is hoped that options turn in the money when markets fall. However, hedges come at a cost, may not be fully efficient and need continuous monitoring and adjustments. They can take focus away from studying and tracking companies. We are yet to find a simple, cheap and effective way to hedge using options. The better path, for us, lies in selectively taking risks where rewards are commensurate and avoiding those where they are not.

Trying to fall less

We continue to stick to the following combination to improve chances of falling less in a heated market:

  1. Quality focus: Investing in companies with strong balance sheets, large opportunity size, competitive advantages and being run by able and fair managements tends to cushion portfolios in volatile markets. While they too fall when aggregate markets fall, they normally get stronger and recover faster.
  1. Valuation discipline: Quality stocks bought at expensive valuations may not protect the downside. Ensuring reasonable purchase prices is key. Result of quality focus and valuation discipline is waiting for right opportunities and parking money in safe and liquid instruments. As a sidenote, current cash balance of Berkshire Hathway (Warren Buffett’s company) has reached 30% of its asset values, highest since 1990s.
  1. Smart diversification: A well-diversified portfolio reduces exposure to any single adverse event. Selecting quality companies at reasonable valuations across less-correlated exposures ensures resilience against unforeseen shocks. 
  1. Careful performance evaluation: A “falling less” strategy often underperforms in euphoric markets. Fair evaluation requires assessing performance over a full market cycle and focusing on metrics like batting averages (frequency of outperformance) and invested IRR (portfolio IRR excluding cash). We will share these metrics in a later section. 

Falling less isn’t about avoiding risk altogether; it’s about managing risk intelligently. By prioritizing capital preservation, one can position to participate in recoveries and harness the full power of compounding. When valuations are elevated, defence is the best offense. 

Cautious stance stays.

 

 

A. PERFORMANCE

 

A1. Statutory PMS Performance Disclosure

Portfolio YTD FY25 FY24 FY23  FY22 FY 21  FY 20* Since Inception* Outper-formance Cash Bal.
CED Long Term Focused Value (PMS) 17.3% 29.2% -4.3% 14.9% 48.5% -9.5% 16.0% 19.7%
S&P BSE 500 TRI (includes dividends) 10.8% 40.2% -0.9% 22.3% 78.6% -23.4% 19.0% -3.0% NIL
*From Jul 24, 2019; Since inception performance is annualised; Note: As required by SEBI, the returns are calculated on time weighted average (NAV) basis. The returns are NET OF ALL EXPENSES AND FEES. The returns pertain to ENTIRE portfolio of our one and only strategy. Individual investor returns may vary from above owing to different investment dates. Annual returns are audited but not verified by SEBI. W.e.f. April 01, 2023 SEBI requires use of any one from Nifty50, BSE500 or MSEI SX40 as a benchmark. We have chosen BSE500 as our benchmark as it best captures our multi-cap stance. 

 

Trying to fall Less

The BSE 500 index fell 7.8% including dividends in the December 2024 quarter – highest quarterly fall since June’22. We posted a return of -0.6% in the same period – falling less by 7.2%. Falling less in one quarter may be due to luck, or mean reversion of past few years’ underperformance. Time will tell. To try falling less in an elevated market, we remain steadfast on price-quality discipline. For more colour on our performance, we share two metrices:

Batting Average (64%)- Batting average measures the ratio of successful investments to total investments. Here, we are defining success as generating an IRR (internal rate of return) above 15% – roughly the average long-term return of the BSE 500 index.

  • Batting average by Count: Since our inception in 2019, we have made 26 investments. Out of these, 19 investments delivered IRRs exceeding 15%, resulting in a batting average by count of 73%.
  • Batting average by Value: Above metric doesn’t account for the size of each investment. When we evaluate batting average by value—i.e., the proportion of capital allocated to investments generating over 15% IRR—the batting average is 64%. This means that out of every ₹100 deployed over the last five years, ₹64 has delivered returns exceeding 15%.

Equity IRR (25.5%) – Of that ₹64 delivering IRRs exceeding 15%, there have been few investments that have delivered 25%-100% IRR. So, another way of assessing performance is to look at IRR of equity performance excluding cash. As of today, the actual IRR of our equity portfolio (excluding cash allocations) stands at 25.5%, reflecting strong overall performance. Cautious stance and higher cash balance is the only factor that has led to slightly lower returns when compared to BSE 500 in last few years. To summarise:

SN CED PMS (2019-2024) Details
1 Headline returns 16.0%
2 Batting Average – 15% IRR threshold (count) 73%
3 Batting Average – 15% IRR threshold (value) 64%
4 Equity IRR 25.5%

 

 

A2. Underlying business performance

 

Past Twelve Months Earnings per unit (EPU)2 FY 2025 EPU (expected)
Sep 2024 8.91 8.5-9.53
Jun 2024 (Previous Quarter) 8.8 8.5-9.53
Sep 2023 (Previous Year) 7.1
Annual Change 25.4%
CAGR since inception (Jun 2019) 14.1%
1 Last four quarters ending Sep 2024. Results of Dec quarter are declared by Feb only. 2 EPU = Total normalised earnings accruing to the aggregate portfolio divided by units outstanding. 3 Please note: the forward earnings per unit (EPU) are conservative estimates of our expectation of future earnings of underlying companies. In past we have been wrong – often by wide margin – in our estimates and there is a risk that we are wrong about the forward EPU reported to you above. 

 

Trailing Earnings: Earnings Per Unit for last twelve months ending Sep’2024 came in at Rs 8.9 per unit, a growth of 25.4% over last year.

 

1-Yr Forward Earnings: We maintain FY25 forward earnings per unit guidance at Rs 8.5-9.5.

 

A3. Underlying portfolio parameters

 

Dec 2024 Trailing P/E Forward P/E Portfolio RoIC Portfolio Turnover1
CED LTFV (PMS) 25.2x 23.6x-26.3x 38.0%3 4.5%
BSE 500 26.1x2 15.2%2
1 ‘sale of equity shares’ divided by ‘average portfolio value’ during the year to date period. 2Source: Asia Index. 3Portfolio Return on Invested Capital (RoIC) is on core equity positions. For BSE 500 index we share the RoE (Return on Equity)

 

B. DETAILS ON PERFORMANCE

B1. MISTAKES AND LEARNINGS

There were no mistakes to report in this period.

 

B2. MAJOR PORTFOLIO CHANGES

Bought: We introduced one new toe hold position (1% weight). The company is a global leader in an emerging disruptive product and has returns on invested capital of over 80%. Valuations at over 50x trailing earnings stopped us from raising our position. We will share further details in future should we scale up this position.

Sold: We did not sell anything in the reporting period.

 

B4. FLOWS AND SENTIMENTS

हर शख़्स दौड़ता है यहाँ भीड़ की तरफ़

फिर ये भी चाहता है उसे रास्ता मिले

(everyone is running towards crowds and still wishes to get a clear path)

-Wasim Barelvi

 Retail investors’ activities have increased by factor of 3x-11x over last 5 years and have been the key determinant of ~25% and ~32% CAGR returns of midcap and smallcap indices respectively in that period. The below table captures the growth in retail participation metrices:

SN Particulars 2019 2024 Change
1 Equity oriented active mutual funds – assets under management (lac cr.) 10.6 37.7 3.6x
2 Demat accounts (cr.) 3.9 18.2 4.7x
3 Unique investors (PAN) (cr.) 3.0 10.2 3.4x
4 Gross monthly SIP in equity mutual funds (Rs cr./month) 8,500 25,300 3.0x
6 Individual Future & Options participants (lacs) 8.5 95.8 11.3x
Source: SEBI

To be fair, before 2019, Indian retail investors were under invested in capital markets. Their higher equity participation is welcome. However, looking at various parameters, it seems things are going to the other extreme. FOMO and not valuations is the main driver of investor enthusiasm today. And in a classic example of circular loop, the resulting momentum of flows is raising the stock prices and rewarding their risky behaviour.

One outcome of higher retail participation is the outperformance of smallcaps over largecaps. While largecap indices have risen 2x, smallcaps have surged 4x in last 5 years. In CY2024, largecap indices gained 9%, but smallcaps outperformed with a remarkable 29% increase. Post September-October, when most broader indices fell nearly 12%, smallcaps’ recovery has been notably faster. Smallcap indices are now only 5% below their recent peaks, compared to largecaps being lower 10%. This trend is unusual. Historically, largecaps have rebounded faster than smallcaps after a correction. The divergence can be partially attributed to foreign investors, who have been net sellers primarily targeting largecaps, while retail investors (directly or through mutual funds) have channelled their buying efforts into small and midcaps.

Smart money is exiting. Promoters, and private equity investors have sold stakes worth Rs. 3 lac crores in CY2024, highest ever through IPO/ QIP/ stake sales. In a first, India has outpaced China in value and the US in volume of IPOs launched in CY2024. In addition, foreign investors have sold 14bn$ in Oct and Nov 2024, highest ever in two months.

In a welcome move, regulators have started introducing curbs on excessive speculations. SEBI has issued restraining circulars on three high risk pockets – zero-day options, SME IPOs and distribution commissions on NFOs (new fund offers). RBI has also put restrictions on unsecured lending a part of which might have been going into equity markets.

 

C. OTHER THOUGHTS

HANDLING INVESTMENT ADVICE IN A BULL MARKET

A bull market often acts as a “business season” for the investment and financial world. Brokers experience a surge in trading activity, investment bankers work on more IPO and QIP deals, and mutual funds see higher inflows. At the same time, mischievous promoters, influencers, and tipsters (often fraudsters) find opportunities to exploit unsuspecting investors.

With the rise of app-based trading, acting on recommendations has become effortless—one moment you’re reading a stock tip, the next you’re executing a trade. But this convenience can also lead to costly mistakes.

Ultimately, the investor’s best defense against subpar or risky products is vigilance and self-awareness. Here’s a checklist to help navigate any investment solicitation: 

Questions to Ask Yourself

  1. Do I understand the company or product?
    If the investment doesn’t make sense even after thorough research, it’s best to avoid it.
  2. Are the past returns unrealistically high?
    Extraordinary returns often revert to the mean. Be cautious if it seems too good to be true.
  3. Am I following the crowd?
    Are you drawn to this investment because friends, family, or social media are hyping it up? Social proof can be misleading. Return to Question 1.

Questions to Ask the Seller

  1. Are you an Insider?

If the proposer is sharing a material non-public information obtained from insider access, strongly avoid and prevent falling foul with insider trading violations.

  1. Are you SEBI-registered?
    If the seller isn’t registered with SEBI, it’s a clear red flag. Avoid.
  2. What are your incentives?
    Find out how the seller benefits:

    • Are they earning commissions or fees based on your investment or training course purchases?
    • Or are they incentivized by your actual investment gains?
      Be sceptical if it’s the former, even if they are your friends or family (especially if they are).
  3. Are you personally invested in what you’re selling?
    Request for documentary proof of their own investments in the product they are selling. If the seller hasn’t put his/her own money into the product, it’s a sign they may not believe in its potential.

By asking these critical questions, maintaining a healthy scepticism and using calm judgement, you can avoid being taken for a ride and protect your hard-earned money.

***

We welcome two CA industrial trainees –Dhruva Koolwal and Aayush Choudhary to our team. Dhruva is a school topper, holds rank in CA Foundation and is district topper in CA Intermediate exam. He is ex-Grant Thornton. Aayush cleared CA Foundation and Intermediate exams in first attempt mostly through self-study. He is ex-Protivity.

As always, gratitude for your trust and patience. Kindly do share your thoughts, if any. Your feedback helps us improve our services to you!

Wishing you a great 2025!

Kind regards,

Team Compound Everyday Capital

Sumit Sarda, Surbhi Kabra Sarda, Punit Patni, Arpit Parmar, Dhruva Koolwal, Aayush Choudhary

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Disclaimer: Compound Everyday Capital Management LLP is SEBI registered Portfolio Manager with registration number INP 000006633. Past performance is not necessarily indicative of future results. All information provided herein is for informational purposes only and should not be deemed as a recommendation to buy or sell securities. This transmission is confidential and may not be redistributed without the express written consent of Compound Everyday Capital Management LLP and does not constitute an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to purchase any security or investment product. Reference to an index does not imply that the firm will achieve returns, volatility, or other results similar to the index.

 

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Investing during elections

Government policies and regulations have a material impact on business growth and profitability. Research has shown that business/ capitalism friendly policies add to general national prosperity. Take for instance the 1991 Economic Liberalisation in India. That single decision has altered the trajectory of wealth creation by Indian businesses. Respect for trade, commerce, enterprise and property rights has been a common source of wealth creation across multiple countries including Switzerland, Singapore, America, Japan, and to a limited extent, even China.

It is not surprising that Indian markets are cheering the expectation of the Modi government’s relection in the forthcoming elections. Over last 10 years, the Modi government has spearheaded many notable reforms including GST, reduction of corporate income taxes, speeding up infrastructure spends, fostering digitalisation through JAM – Jandhan, Aadhar and Mobile – trinity and promoting Make in India to name a few.

While the impact of policies on business growth is clear, the near term impact on the markets is less so. Two key challenges are (a) double counting and (b) impact of other factors:

Often, expected election outcomes already get baked into prices. Expecting a further rise when markets have already risen can be a double counting error.

Also, politics is not the only factor that affects markets. Global interest rates (falling interest rates since 2008 to 2022), global economic cycle (Chinese commodity boom in 2003-2007), geo political issues (Kargil war, 9/11, Ukraine-Russia war), technological changes (internet in 2010s and AI currently), demographics etc. all can have multiplicative or countervailing effect on markets.

Here are few examples of how correlation between elections and stock market is messy:

After rising 3x post Economic Liberalisation of July 1991, (partly due to the Harshad Mehta scam), the BSE Sensex remained flat for next 11 years even as the benefits of Liberalisation continued. There was the Asian crisis, Pokhran nuclear test (leading to global sanctions), and the Kargil War all in between.

In the 2004 elections, there were high expectations of the BJP-led government’s re-election under Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee. We all remember the optimistic “India Shining” campaign. Contrary to expectations, the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) won, initially leading to a 14% drop in the Nifty Index over the month following the election. However, the market was up 24% next year due to the Chinese commodity boom.

Or, take the 2009 elections, when Sensex was up 81% for the full year on re-election of The UPA’s government with a stronger coalition. How much of this was due to UPA re-election and how much a recovery from steep fall the previous year due to the Global Financial Crisis, is difficult to segregate.

In summary, it is not very easy to pinpoint election outcome’s exact and solitary impact on stock markets both in near term and longer term. This is because not only do prices bake in expectations, but there are other factors at play too.

Our approach is taking election outcomes as one of the many inputs into assessment of a company’s economic worth and comparing that worth with prices. Election outcomes stack lower than many other more important inputs like size of opportunity, competitive advantage, management quality etc in the pecking order. While there may be some businesses that directly benefit from who is in the power (infra, mining, defence, capital goods etc), economic cadence of businesses that we like (not many in the above list) are not materially affected by who’s in charge of the country so long as capitalism and free enterprise flourish.

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From Beginner’s Luck to Winner’s Curse?

 

Consider this: If 1000 monkeys had constructed portfolios of Indian stocks in the calendar year 2021, how many of those 1000 portfolios would have beaten the BSE 500 index after 3 years?

The surprising answer: ALMOST ALL OF THEM (997 of 1000).

No, these aren’t specially gifted/ trained primates; they’re random monkeys with random portfolios. We conducted a simulation with 1000 random portfolios. Each portfolio picked 100 equal weighted stocks at random from the BSE 500 universe in calendar year 2021. To remove starting period bias, we excluded period from May 2020 to December 2020 (marked by a sharp recovery from Covid-19 lows). Additionally, we assumed that stocks were added on a monthly basis throughout calendar year 2021. Then, on March 31, 2024, we compared the performance of these 1000 portfolios with that of the BSE 500 index, assuming a similar monthly purchases of the index. Remarkably, almost all monkey portfolios outperformed BSE 500’s 15% annualised returns from 2021 to March 2024, recording a median return of 22% p.a.

The secret behind this superlative performance lies in the starting point and market’s direction during the study period. Stocks have been on a relentless ascent since Covid-19 lows in May 2020. Many small and midcap BSE 500 stocks with less than 1% weight in the index have surged 3x to 12x. An equally weighted portfolio of random 100 stocks would allocate 1% weight to these stocks. Just a few such stocks are sufficient to improve the portfolio performance materially. Moreover, hardly any stock experienced significant declines to drag down the overall performance. If these portfolios were allowed to include micro caps, IPOs and SME IPO stocks (currently excluded) or reduce the number of stocks from 100 to say 50 or even 30, their performance would have risen further (100% outperformance; over 22% median return).

This outcome – call it beginner’s luck – mirrors the experience of many new investors who entered equity markets post Covid-19. Consistently beating the index is challenging even for seasoned investors. So, after outperforming the index over 3 years, many novice investors may start to believe that they possess a Midas touch for stock picking. However, in reality, the past 3 years’ success is largely attributable to luck. Worryingly, nothing sets up someone for financial and/or emotional ruin more than luck mistaken as skill and/ or an imprudent approach rewarded handsomely. Emboldened by their riches, many investors will raise their bets (trade in options, dabble in stocks of questionable companies etc.) precisely at the wrong time, and fall victim to the winner’s curse.

We also conducted a reality check: we made those 1000 monkeys repeat the same exercise in calendar year 2018. How many of them would have beaten the BSE 500 by June 2020? Only 200 out of 1000, with a median return of -6%. The reason? The markets were in decline from 2018 to June 2020.

Liquidity can propel stock prices to any level in the short term. However, fundamentals and valuations ultimately serve as anchors. Until then, ironically, a thoughtful investing approach may seem foolish, while a foolish investing approach may appear thoughtful. It’s therefore difficult to correctly evaluate performance in a uni-directionally rising market. The true test of investment skill lies in a falling market. Correct evaluation period should encompass a full market cycle, not just one phase as is the case with last three years. A full cycle is when margins and multiples both mean revert. A strong performance across full cycle results from being mindful of risks in a rising market and maintaining the price and quality discipline consistently.

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Embracing Truth, Light and Immortality in Investing

असतो मा सद्गमय। तमसो मा ज्योतिर्गमय। मृत्योर्मामृतं गमय

(May we move from untruth to truth, darkness to light, and mortality to immortality.)

– Brihadaranyaka Upanishad

 

Truth: There are only a few eternal truths in investing. Some of them include: (a) Stocks are not pieces of paper, they represent partial ownership in live businesses. (b) The value of a business (and therefore stocks) is the present value of cash that can be taken out of the business over its life. That depends on opportunity size, competitive advantage and management quality. And, (c) Risk stems from acting without understanding this value and/ or paying above the conservatively assessed value. The closer our actions are to these truths, the better our long term performance will be.

Light: Returns lie in the future. However, future is uncertain and dark. Only an intellectually honest understanding of a business can shine light on its character and help predict its future. While perfect understanding of a business is impossible, honest working understanding of key variables is sufficient. Mistakes occur when we think we understand a business when actually we don’t. Hence there is need for humility, sceptic mindset and use of common sense, forensics, and triangulations. Unless proved otherwise, every incoming information about a company needs to be doubted. Keeping our hypothesis always in question and seeking to invalidate our most loved beliefs can allow us to move towards light.

Another aspect of darkness is our biases and emotions that prevent us from seeing the light. Greed, envy, fear of losing or missing out, overconfidence, and hubris obstruct the light of rationality. While these biases and emotions have evolutionary importance, they become counterproductive while investing. It may sound funny, but the first impulse is usually wrong in investing and it would be safe to act opposite to it. Being greedy when fearful, for example. Yes it is difficult to go against our evolutionary programming, but staying aware of our emotions and biases can take us towards right action. 

Immortality: Being a custodian of wealth that is going to be useful not only for the current but even future generations, we need to think in terms of decades instead of quarters. Our first objective as investors should, therefore, be to avoid mortal mistakes, financial ruin and permanent loss of capital. Focus on risk should precede expectation of riches. This requires preference for sustainability and repeatability.

Prices often rise in short term due non-fundamental reasons including narrative, liquidity and news flow; many times against fundamental reality. While riding such rise due to luck or design looks temptingly doable, it is not sustainable (at least for us) and may eventually reverse. In longer run, paying below carefully assessed fundamental value is the only way we understand to sustainable returns.

Lastly, when assessing value or behaving, we should remember that most things – high growth, high margins, success and failure are impermanent. Prices move from being expensive to being cheap and vice versa. By retaining equanimity and behaving counter-cyclically, we can use these swings to our advantage.

In summary, we have to keep moving towards and sticking to a process that is based on eternal truths, intellectual honesty and sustainability.

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Underperformance of an Investment Style

 

Practicing a sensible investment style consistently is important for investment performance. There will be periods when a style will be out of favour. And with each year of underperformance, one will wonder if the style works (Warren Buffet in 1998-2000; Prashant Jain in 2015-2019). The tendency to dump the out of favour style and hug the popular style is highest at the time when the out of favour style starts working again (both Warren and Prashant came out on top as cycle reversed).

So if the style makes economic and rational sense, there is need to endure especially when the confidence is low. 

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Five hurdle checklist that reduces risks and improves returns

Surgeons, pilots and many critical professionals have saved lives using checklists. In last 12 years, our investment checklist has evolved after being battle tested with real life wins and losses. Here’s that checklist summarised into five key hurdles/ questions that every company we own or wish to own has to pass:

First and the biggest hurdle is that we must be able to independently understand the business. This involves understanding how the business makes money and why do consumers demand its product/ services. Due to complexity of the business or our own ignorance, many businesses are not able to pass through this screen. No understanding, no conviction, no investment case. Time, reading and thinking help us improve understanding of new or existing businesses.

The second key question that we ask is how large is the opportunity size. A company that is serving an essential product/ service with no threat of substitution and has low penetration can be said to have a long runway (for example demat accounts, air conditioners, health insurance etc). A definite disruption threat is a key risk to avoid.

Long runway, however, in itself is not enough. The business should have some inherent competitive advantage that allows it to tap the runway profitably. Competitive advantage allows the company to protect profits from competition or regulations. Low cost, network effects, patent/ license/ copyright, switching costs, consumer habits, culture etc. can be some of the sources of competitive advantage. Without competitive advantage, growth does not create shareholder value. This is an area where we spend a lot of time. High returns on capital hints presence of an advantage in the past. We probe the causes and durability of such high returns. It is important not to mistake cyclical tailwind/ headwind as competitive advantage/ disadvantage.

The fourth and the most difficult filter is management quality. We look at the past actions of management around three areas. First is execution track record i.e. ability to create distribution, human resource, and supply chain capabilities that allows it to maintain or grow its market share. Second is capital allocation i.e. investing incremental earnings on return accretive projects or in absence, returning them back to shareholders in best possible way. Last is treatment of minority shareholders as evident from accounting quality, embezzlement, remuneration and skin in the game.

The last but important hurdle is valuation. For core equity positions, valuation alone is useless unless the company passes all the four hurdles above. Our preferred method to value is to see what growth and margin assumptions are built into current price versus (a) past and (b) our conservative imagination of its future. Often a company that passes the above four tests does not come cheap. While quality demands paying up, paying any price can be a mistake. We need to wait for temporary hardships or size discount (smaller companies can remain mispriced due to lack of attention from larger investors) that can create mispricings.

Despite failing to pass one or more of the above five hurdles, a company’s stock may do temporarily well. An 80 P/E stock may go to 100P/E; stock of a company in a new long runway sector but no entry barrier may rise in initial euphoria; temporary tailwinds may be mistaken for enduring advantage etc. But if the truth around the five steps hold, weak thesis gets its due punishment. Conversely, a company passing through all the five hurdles sooner or later gets it due reward. Keeping the investing bar high and executing all five of them with discipline and margin of safety is the key to minimise investment mistakes and improve long term returns. Funnily, the five hurdle process eventually works because it does not always work

 

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Preferred Way to Reduce Risk in a Rising Market

 

“Risk means more things can happen than will happen”

-Elroy Dimson

 

In a rising market, most investment/ trading styles do well despite overpaying. For, money gushing into any asset class can raise its price irrespective of underlying value. Prudence and safety are needless, even penalised during such times. But like most good things, such good runs – even if they extend over a long time – eventually reverse. Waking up to build controls after such reversal is too late.

Portfolio safety is like a car’s seat belt. Both are minor irritants in good times, but life-saving during accidents. Just as it is prudent to always wear seat belts tolerating minor discomfort, it is important to control risk in portfolios even in good times tolerating lower relative returns.

Our preferred way to reduce risk in the portfolio is to buy a diversified set of good companies cheaply and hold them till they remain good and don’t get super expensive. Yes, there is an inherent conflict in this goal. Markets have become more efficient and everyone is trying to do the same. So good companies donot come cheap. Mostly. But there are two pockets where mispricings are common. First is temporary hardships either in the world, country, sector or company during which even good companies get traded at throw away prices. And second is smaller companies which are not so well tracked and/ or are less liquid and can remain mispriced.

Doing the above is easy in theory but difficult in practice. We need to exercise discipline and have safety margin in all the three components – (a) diversified uncorrelated positions, (b) good companies, and (c) reasonable valuations.

And while doing the above, there are bouts of luck and mistakes. Many times, probable outcomes don’t happen and/ or improbable outcomes happen. Often we get good outcomes beyond our expectations due to plain good luck. These times call for humility and trimming positions that get super expensive. Conversely despite doing the right thing our positions can fall. If there is no material deterioration in underlying fundamentals, these are times not for despondency or self-pity, but raising our bets. Lastly, we make mistakes; they are normal in a pursuit of higher than risk-free returns. When we make mistakes, mention of their account precedes that of achievements so that we don’t lose the lessons.

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Focus on Intrinsic Value

 

“What do you see, son”? Asked Guru Dronacharya. “Only the bird’s eye, Sir”, replied Arjun.

-the Mahabharat

We all have grown up listening to this Mahabharat  story on importance of focus. Whether its archery or investing, great achievements demand undivided focus. The bird’s eye equivalent in long term investing that demands undivided focus is company’s intrinsic value (or economic worth, in simpler terms). For, only that can help us decide if a company is undervalued or overvalued versus its stock price. Everything else, is noise.

To recall, a company’s intrinsic value is the present value of its future free cash flows. Two broad components of intrinsic value calculation are (1) future free cash flows (i.e. cash earnings less investments) and (2) future interest rates to discount those cashflows to their present values (aka discount rates).

Assessing intrinsic value, thus, requires looking into the future – for both cash flows and discount rates. Unlike Arjun’s bird in the Mahabharat that is still and clearly visible, intrinsic value is therefore a moving and hazy bird.

Future cashflows: Either due to their nature or our current ignorance, we cannot imagine future cash flows of most of the companies. It’s futile to even attempt their intrinsic value calculations. For, in archery parlance, we cannot even see the bird. Nonetheless, there is a sub set of companies where we can. Mostly these companies provide essential, under-penetrated or non-substitutable products/ services competitively and are run by able and honest management. They are expected to see reasonable revenue growth and high returns on capital. Here is where we limit ourselves looking.

Future interest rates: For intrinsic value purposes we are concerned, not with interest rates of next quarter or year, but with long term future interest rates. Just as assuming very low long term future interest rates is mistaken (last 10 years), so is assuming very high long term interest rates (temptation today). We need to assume moderate interest rates over long term in our intrinsic value assessment. Given that 30-yr Indian government securities are yielding around 7% today (2024), 4% is too low, and 15% too high for discount rate. Anywhere between 10%-12% sounds okay, today.

We need to place all incoming information in above backdrop. Discipline to limit ourselves to sound companies and focus on their intrinsic values that correctly embeds future cashflows and long term future interest rates will allow us to ignore noise and take right investment actions.

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7 key learnings from 10 years of Compound Everyday Capital

Journey is the destination

We completed 10 years at Compound Everyday Capital in 2022 and shared seven of our key learnings with our investors:

1. Risk > Return: In our initial days while we thought we were risk conscious, our primary focus was on returns. We didn’t know that we didn’t know. Despite taking risks that we were unaware of, we did well due to luck. The wrong lessons led to mistakes, heartburn and learning. The learning is that risk management and capital protection should be the primary goal of investing. And the simplest way to reduce risk in equity investing is not to overpay after doing proper valuation work that incorporates quality of business and management, uncertainty, cyclicity, possibility of being wrong and base rates. Putting risk first, however, is not as easy as it sounds. For, in a rising market a risk based investment approach will feel like what insurance premium feels until there is an accident – a needless cost. However over the longer term this risk focused approach, like insurance, will avoid large drawdowns and come out better even if it lags in interim.

2. Seek to invalidate: Evolution has ill prepared human mind for investing. Emotions, while good for surviving in the savannah, work counter-productively in investing. In past, ego and confirmation bias had stopped us from rejecting our delusions. We were caught trying to justify low valuations without looking at perils. If we had worked on an idea, it started looking good to our mind -ego. We selectively looked at positives to justify holding – confirmation bias. Bruised ego, we learnt painfully, is better than burnt pockets. Today when we get a new idea, our first reaction is to try to actively kill it. Our initial research focuses on searching for evidences that proves that the bet is subpar and therefore not worth spending more time. Only if we find ourselves unable to actively kill an idea, we move ahead with it but try to remain ready to ditch if thesis doesn’t unfold as we though. Care is needed not to take this too far, for it can foster cynicism and inactivity. It’s a difficult balance to achieve, but we are trying. On balance, this approach has saved us on more occasions than leading us astray.

3. Two key risks – Poor Management, Disrupted Business: We have made a handful of mistakes that tick this box. Management that, in past, has not allocated capital well, not has executed well, has not adopted conservative accounting or has not treated minority investors well are clear red flags. Similarly when we find evidence that a business is definitely disrupted or if the new technology weakens a company’s competitive positioning, we are worried. In both these cases, we avoid/exit irrespective how mouth-watering surface valuations look. They are mostly traps.

4. Temporary hardships are good: Often the type of company that we like – exceptional business run by able and honest management – is what everyone likes as well. This means most of them are well tracked and efficiently priced most of the time. However temporary setbacks in either the company, sector, country or the world engenders fear which breaks their efficient pricing mechanism. These are the only times when exceptional businesses can be found at exceptional prices. Benefitting from temporary hardships requires preparation and waiting. Preparation for understanding the right companies, and waiting for temporary hardships. Caution, however, is needed to ensure that the hardships are indeed temporary and not permanent.

5. Most things are cyclical: In investing, like in life, good times are followed by bad and vice versa. Demand, supply, growth, margins and multiples go through cycles and mean revert. Peak growth, peak margins and peak multiples often occur in life of a company. During such times, FOMO (fear of missing out), accolades, media narratives and halo effect can tempt one to give in and enter at wrong times. Opposite happens when cycle reverses. Awareness of cycles, therefore, is a good way to profit from them.

6. Expanding circle of competence: Doing proper valuation work is the bed rock of risk based investing. We cannot assess whether a company is over or under valued unless we have an opinion about its intrinsic value. Forming this opinion requires good understanding of a company – it’s business model, size of opportunity, competitive position, key drivers etc. It’s usually safe to skip an idea if we cannot understand the business and if it falls outside our circle of competence – which happens often with us. While this discipline is important, what makes our work both engaging and challenging at the same time is the efforts required to expand this circle of competence one company at a time. Larger the circle, larger is the fishing pond.

7. Smart Diversification: All returns lie in the future, but the future is unknowable. Despite best efforts, rapid technological change, uncertainty, ignorance and mistakes will remain investing challenges. Too much concentration can raise risks. To provide for these risks, we need humility in sizing our bets and diversifying intelligently. An intelligently diversified portfolio is one where constituent securities donot always move in one direction and thus lend resilience across multiple adverse scenarios over longer term. Care, conversely, is also needed not to over-diversify else winners will not move the needle.

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