{"id":1259,"date":"2025-01-08T10:52:20","date_gmt":"2025-01-08T10:52:20","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/cedcapital.in\/?p=1259"},"modified":"2025-01-10T14:27:18","modified_gmt":"2025-01-10T14:27:18","slug":"letter-to-investors-dec24-extracts","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cedcapital.in\/?p=1259","title":{"rendered":"Letter to Investors \u2013 Dec\u201924 \u2013 Extracts"},"content":{"rendered":"

 <\/p>\n\n\n\n
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n
    \n
  • \n
      \n
    • For the Dec\u201924 quarter, the BSE500 index reported a change of -7.8% including dividends. We reported -0.6%.\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n
    • Trailing twelve months\u2019 earnings of underlying portfolio companies grew by 25%.<\/span><\/li>\n
    • In an elevated market like current one, falling less might be more important than rising more.<\/span><\/li>\n
    • Looking at our batting average and equity IRRs.<\/span><\/li>\n
    • We introduced a new toehold position.<\/span><\/li>\n
    • Stance: Cautious<\/strong><\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

      Dear Fellow Investors,<\/span><\/p>\n

      Falling less > Rising more<\/em><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

       <\/p>\n

      Investment success is often celebrated through spectacular gains, but history and track record of great investors suggest that falling less is equally important. Focus on capital preservation and avoiding large drawdowns has higher probability of doing well than chasing high returns. This is all the more important in an elevated market like current one.<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

      \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

      Mathematics of falling Less<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

      20% annual returns for 6 years followed by -15% annual returns in next two years reduces the 8-year CAGR (compounded annual growth rate) to ~10%. Conversely, 12.5% annual returns for 6 years followed by 7.5% p.a. return in next two years leads to a CAGR of ~11%. The table below illustrates this:<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Scenario<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\nCAGR<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

      (Years 1-6)<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\n

      		CAGR <\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

      (Years 7-8)<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\n

      		8-Year CAGR<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      Portfolio 1: Steady growth, no drop<\/span><\/td>\n12.5%<\/span><\/td>\n7.5%<\/span><\/td>\n11.2%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Portfolio 2: High growth, then drop<\/span><\/td>\n19.9%<\/span><\/td>\n-15.6%<\/span><\/td>\n9.8%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

       <\/p>\n

      These are not imaginary portfolios. The first portfolio above is Nifty 50<\/strong> index and the second portfolio is BSE Smallcap <\/strong>index. And the 8 years in question are CY2011-2019 (a full cycle). This is neither a praise of the former nor a critique of the latter and may not hold true in all periods and portfolios. But it is a good reference period for the largecap-smallcap<\/strong> divergence we are seeing today. This illustration underscores that buying price matters and valuations & returns tend to mean revert.<\/span>\u00a0<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

      Rising more + falling less?<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

      It is tempting to imagine holding \u201cPortfolio 2\u201d during high growth years and switching to \u201cPortfolio 1\u201d before the downturn. While this strategy sounds appealing in hindsight, it\u2019s difficult to execute in practice. A \u201crising more\u201d approach is pro-cyclical, encouraging higher risk-taking in an already risky market. It works like magic when things are going well amassing praise, confidence and money. FOMO (fear of missing out) makes it difficult to let it go. Also, professional managers following \u201crising more\u201d style set wrong expectations for incoming investors\/ money and find it difficult to justify moving to an opposite strategy. Some, either due to luck or skill, may be able to straddle both styles. But for most, its either one or the other.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

      Buy high, sell low<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

      A \u201crising more\u201d strategy can lead to challenges when fund inflows and outflows are unrestricted. Stellar bull-market performance attracts inflows at peak valuations, raising the probability of subpar future returns. Conversely, during market corrections, such strategies often face deeper drawdowns, prompting panicked investor exits at a loss. The 2011-2019 performance of smallcap indices exemplifies this phenomenon. Morningstar\u2019s “Mind the Gap”<\/em> study consistently finds that investor returns lag fund returns by 1-2% annually due to poor timing decisions, with the gap widening for more volatile strategies. Lower volatility in a \u201cfalling less\u201d strategy reduces these risks, ensuring newer investors are not disadvantaged and minimizing the likelihood of buying high and selling low.<\/span><\/p>\n

      Balancing risk and return<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

      A simple way to minimize losses could involve staying 100% in cash<\/strong>, earning a risk-free rate (currently 6-7% p.a.). However, risk avoidance leads to return avoidance too<\/strong>. Plus, timing market tops and bottoms credibly is nearly impossible. Hedging<\/strong> using options is another way. It is hoped that options turn in the money when markets fall. However, hedges come at a cost, may not be fully efficient and need continuous monitoring and adjustments. They can take focus away from studying and tracking companies. We are yet to find a simple, cheap and effective way to hedge using options. The better path, for us, lies in selectively taking risks where rewards are commensurate and avoiding those where they are not.<\/span><\/p>\n

      Trying to fall less<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

      We continue to stick to the following combination to improve chances of falling less in a heated market:<\/span><\/p>\n

        \n
      1. Quality focus<\/strong>: Investing in companies with strong balance sheets, large opportunity size, competitive advantages and being run by able and fair managements tends to cushion portfolios in volatile markets. While they too fall when aggregate markets fall, they normally get stronger and recover faster<\/strong>.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
          \n
        1. Valuation discipline<\/strong>: Quality stocks bought at expensive valuations may not protect the downside. Ensuring reasonable purchase prices is key. Result of quality focus and valuation discipline is waiting<\/strong> for right opportunities and parking money in safe and<\/em> liquid instruments. As a sidenote, current cash balance of Berkshire Hathway (Warren Buffett\u2019s company) has reached 30% of its asset values, highest since 1990s.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
            \n
          1. Smart diversification<\/strong>: A well-diversified portfolio reduces exposure to any single adverse event. Selecting quality companies at reasonable valuations across less-correlated exposures<\/strong> ensures resilience against unforeseen shocks.<\/span>\u00a0<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
              \n
            1. Careful performance evaluation<\/strong>: A \u201cfalling less\u201d strategy often underperforms in euphoric markets. Fair evaluation requires assessing performance over a full market cycle<\/strong> and focusing on metrics like batting averages (frequency of outperformance) and invested IRR (portfolio IRR excluding cash). We will share these metrics in a later section.<\/span>\u00a0<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

              Falling less isn\u2019t about avoiding risk altogether; it\u2019s about managing risk intelligently. By prioritizing capital preservation, one can position to participate in recoveries and harness the full power of compounding. When valuations are elevated, defence is the best offense.<\/strong><\/span>\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

              Cautious<\/strong> stance stays.<\/span><\/p>\n

               <\/p>\n

               <\/p>\n

              A. PERFORMANCE<\/span><\/p>\n

               <\/p>\n

              A1. Statutory PMS Performance Disclosure<\/span><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
              Portfolio<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nYTD FY25<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nFY24<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nFY23<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0FY22<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nFY 21\u00a0<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nFY 20*<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nSince Inception*<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nOutper-formance<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nCash Bal.<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
              CED Long Term Focused Value (PMS)<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\n17.3%<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/td>\n29.2%<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/td>\n-4.3%<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/td>\n14.9%<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/td>\n48.5%<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/td>\n-9.5%<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/td>\n16.0%<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/td>\n<\/td>\n19.7%<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
              S&P BSE 500 TRI (includes dividends)<\/span><\/td>\n10.8%<\/span><\/td>\n40.2%<\/span><\/td>\n-0.9%<\/span><\/td>\n22.3%<\/span><\/td>\n78.6%<\/span><\/td>\n-23.4%<\/span><\/td>\n19.0%<\/span><\/td>\n-3.0%<\/span><\/td>\nNIL<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
              *From Jul 24, 2019; Since inception performance is annualised; Note: As required by SEBI, the returns are calculated on time weighted average (NAV) basis. The returns are NET OF ALL EXPENSES AND FEES. The returns pertain to ENTIRE portfolio of our one and only strategy. Individual investor returns may vary from above owing to different investment dates. Annual returns are audited but not verified by SEBI. W.e.f. April 01, 2023 SEBI requires use of any one from Nifty50, BSE500 or MSEI SX40 as a benchmark. We have chosen BSE500 as our benchmark as it best captures our multi-cap stance.\u00a0<\/em><\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

               <\/p>\n

              Trying to fall Less<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

              The BSE 500 index fell 7.8% including dividends in the December 2024 quarter – highest quarterly fall since June\u201922. We posted a return of -0.6% in the same period – falling less by 7.2%.<\/strong> Falling less in one quarter may be due to luck, or mean reversion of past few years\u2019 underperformance. Time will tell. To try falling less in an elevated market, we remain steadfast on price-quality discipline. For more colour on our performance, we share two metrices:<\/span><\/p>\n

              Batting Average (64%)- <\/strong>Batting average measures the ratio of successful investments to total investments. Here, we are defining success as generating an IRR (internal rate of return) above 15%<\/strong> – roughly the average long-term return of the BSE 500 index.<\/span><\/p>\n

                \n
              • Batting average by Count:<\/u> Since our inception in 2019, we have made 26 investments. Out of these, 19 investments delivered IRRs exceeding 15%, resulting in a batting average by count of 73%<\/strong>.<\/span><\/li>\n
              • Batting average by Value<\/u>:<\/strong> Above metric doesn\u2019t account for the size of each investment. When we evaluate batting average by value\u2014i.e., the proportion of capital allocated to investments generating over 15% IRR\u2014the batting average is 64%<\/strong>. This means that out of every \u20b9100 deployed over the last five years, \u20b964 has delivered returns exceeding 15%.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

                Equity IRR (25.5%) – <\/strong>Of that \u20b964 delivering IRRs exceeding 15%, there have been few investments that have delivered 25%-100% IRR. So, another way of assessing performance is to look at IRR of equity performance excluding cash. As of today, the actual IRR of our equity portfolio (excluding cash allocations) stands at 25.5%,<\/strong> reflecting strong overall performance. Cautious stance and higher cash balance is the only factor that has led to slightly lower returns when compared to BSE 500 in last few years. To summarise:<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
                SN<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\nCED PMS (2019-2024)<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\nDetails<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                1<\/span><\/td>\nHeadline returns<\/span><\/td>\n16.0%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                2<\/span><\/td>\nBatting Average – 15% IRR threshold (count)<\/span><\/td>\n73%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                3<\/span><\/td>\nBatting Average – 15% IRR threshold (value)<\/span><\/td>\n64%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                4<\/span><\/td>\nEquity IRR<\/span><\/td>\n25.5%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

                 <\/p>\n

                 <\/p>\n

                A2. Underlying business performance<\/u><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

                 <\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
                Past Twelve Months<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\nEarnings per unit (EPU)2<\/sup><\/strong><\/span><\/td>\nFY 2025 EPU (expected) <\/strong><\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                <\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                Sep 2024<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\n8.91<\/sup><\/strong><\/span><\/td>\n8.5-9.53<\/sup><\/strong><\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                Jun 2024 (Previous Quarter)<\/span><\/td>\n8.8<\/span><\/td>\n8.5-9.53<\/sup><\/strong><\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                Sep 2023 (Previous Year)<\/span><\/td>\n7.1<\/span><\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                Annual Change<\/span><\/td>\n25.4%<\/span><\/span><\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                CAGR since inception (Jun 2019)<\/span><\/td>\n14.1%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                1 <\/sup>Last four quarters ending Sep 2024. Results of Dec quarter are declared by Feb only. 2<\/sup> EPU = Total normalised earnings accruing to the aggregate portfolio divided by units outstanding. 3 <\/sup>Please note: the forward earnings per unit (EPU) are conservative estimates of our expectation of future earnings of underlying companies. In past we have been wrong \u2013 often by wide margin \u2013 in our estimates and there is a risk that we are wrong about the forward EPU reported to you above.\u00a0<\/span><\/em><\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

                 <\/p>\n

                Trailing Earnings:<\/strong> Earnings Per Unit for last twelve months ending Sep\u20192024 came in at Rs 8.9 per unit, a growth of 25.4% over last year.<\/span><\/p>\n

                 <\/p>\n

                1-Yr Forward Earnings:<\/strong> We maintain FY25 forward earnings per unit guidance at Rs 8.5-9.5.<\/span><\/p>\n

                 <\/p>\n

                A3. Underlying portfolio parameters<\/u><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

                 <\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
                Dec 2024<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nTrailing P\/E<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nForward P\/E<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nPortfolio RoIC<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nPortfolio Turnover1<\/sup><\/span><\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                CED LTFV (PMS)<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\n25.2x<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\n23.6x-26.3x<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\n38.0%3<\/sup><\/span><\/strong><\/td>\n4.5%<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                BSE 500<\/span><\/td>\n26.1x2<\/sup><\/span><\/td>\n–<\/span><\/td>\n15.2%2<\/sup><\/span><\/td>\n–<\/span><\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                1<\/sup><\/em> \u2018sale of equity shares\u2019 divided by \u2018average portfolio value\u2019 during the year to date period. <\/span>2<\/sup>Source: Asia Index. 3<\/sup>Portfolio Return on Invested Capital (RoIC) is on core equity positions. For BSE 500 index we share the RoE (Return on Equity)<\/span><\/em><\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

                 <\/p>\n

                B. DETAILS ON PERFORMANCE<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/h1>\n

                B1. MISTAKES AND LEARNINGS<\/span><\/span><\/h2>\n

                There were no mistakes to report in this period.<\/span><\/p>\n

                 <\/p>\n

                B2. MAJOR PORTFOLIO CHANGES<\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/h2>\n

                Bought:<\/strong> We introduced one new toe hold position (1% weight). The company is a global leader in an emerging disruptive product and has returns on invested capital of over 80%. Valuations at over 50x trailing earnings stopped us from raising our position. We will share further details in future should we scale up this position.<\/span><\/p>\n

                Sold:<\/strong> We did not sell anything in the reporting period.<\/span><\/p>\n

                 <\/p>\n

                B4. FLOWS AND SENTIMENTS<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/h2>\n

                \u0939\u0930<\/em> \u0936\u0916\u093c\u094d\u0938<\/em> \u0926\u094c\u0921\u093c\u0924\u093e<\/em> \u0939\u0948<\/em> \u092f\u0939\u093e\u0901<\/em> \u092d\u0940\u0921\u093c<\/em> \u0915\u0940<\/em> \u0924\u0930\u092b\u093c<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

                \u092b\u093f\u0930<\/em> \u092f\u0947<\/em> \u092d\u0940<\/em> \u091a\u093e\u0939\u0924\u093e<\/em> \u0939\u0948<\/em> \u0909\u0938\u0947<\/em> \u0930\u093e\u0938\u094d\u0924\u093e<\/em> \u092e\u093f\u0932\u0947<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

                (everyone is running towards crowds and still wishes to get a clear path)<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

                -Wasim Barelvi<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

                \u00a0<\/em><\/span>Retail investors\u2019 activities have increased by factor of 3x-11x<\/strong> over last 5 years and have been the key determinant of ~25% and ~32% CAGR returns of midcap and smallcap indices respectively in that period. The below table captures the growth in retail participation metrices:<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
                SN<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\nParticulars<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\n2019<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\n2024<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\nChange<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                1<\/span><\/td>\nEquity oriented active mutual funds – assets under management (lac cr.)<\/span><\/td>\n10.6<\/span><\/td>\n37.7<\/span><\/td>\n3.6x<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                2<\/span><\/td>\nDemat accounts (cr.)<\/span><\/td>\n3.9<\/span><\/td>\n18.2<\/span><\/td>\n4.7x<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                3<\/span><\/td>\nUnique investors (PAN) (cr.)<\/span><\/td>\n3.0<\/span><\/td>\n10.2<\/span><\/td>\n3.4x<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                4<\/span><\/td>\nGross monthly SIP in equity mutual funds (Rs cr.\/month)<\/span><\/td>\n8,500<\/span><\/td>\n25,300<\/span><\/td>\n3.0x<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                6<\/span><\/td>\nIndividual Future & Options participants (lacs)<\/span><\/td>\n8.5<\/span><\/td>\n95.8<\/span><\/td>\n11.3x<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                Source: SEBI<\/em><\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

                To be fair, before 2019, Indian retail investors were under invested in capital markets. Their higher equity participation is welcome. However, looking at various parameters, it seems things are going to the other extreme. FOMO and not valuations is the main driver of investor enthusiasm today. And in a classic example of circular loop, the resulting momentum of flows is raising the stock prices and rewarding their risky behaviour.<\/span><\/p>\n

                One outcome of higher retail participation is the outperformance of smallcaps over largecaps.<\/strong> While largecap indices have risen 2x, smallcaps have surged 4x in last 5 years. In CY2024, largecap indices gained 9%, but smallcaps outperformed with a remarkable 29% increase. Post September-October, when most broader indices fell nearly 12%, smallcaps\u2019 recovery has been notably faster. Smallcap indices are now only 5% below their recent peaks, compared to largecaps being lower 10%. This trend is unusual. Historically, largecaps have rebounded faster than smallcaps after a correction. The divergence can be partially attributed to foreign investors, who have been net sellers primarily targeting largecaps, while retail investors (directly or through mutual funds) have channelled their buying efforts into small and midcaps.<\/span><\/p>\n

                Smart money is exiting.<\/strong> Promoters, and private equity investors have sold stakes worth Rs. 3 lac crores<\/strong> in CY2024, highest ever through IPO\/ QIP\/ stake sales. In a first, India has outpaced China in value and the US in volume of IPOs launched in CY2024. In addition, foreign investors have sold 14bn$ in Oct and Nov 2024, highest ever in two months.<\/span><\/p>\n

                In a welcome move, regulators <\/strong>have started introducing curbs on excessive speculations. SEBI has issued restraining circulars on three high risk pockets \u2013 zero-day options, SME IPOs and distribution commissions on NFOs (new fund offers). RBI has also put restrictions on unsecured lending a part of which might have been going into equity markets.<\/span><\/p>\n

                 <\/p>\n

                C. OTHER THOUGHTS<\/span><\/span><\/h1>\n

                HANDLING INVESTMENT ADVICE IN A BULL MARKET<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

                A bull market often acts as a “business season” for the investment and financial world. Brokers experience a surge in trading activity, investment bankers work on more IPO and QIP deals, and mutual funds see higher inflows. At the same time, mischievous promoters, influencers, and tipsters (often fraudsters) find opportunities to exploit unsuspecting investors.<\/span><\/p>\n

                With the rise of app-based trading, acting on recommendations has become effortless\u2014one moment you’re reading a stock tip, the next you’re executing a trade. But this convenience can also lead to costly mistakes.<\/span><\/p>\n

                Ultimately, the investor’s best defense against subpar or risky products is vigilance and self-awareness. Here\u2019s a checklist to help navigate any investment solicitation:<\/span>\u00a0<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

                Questions to Ask Yourself<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

                  \n
                1. Do I understand the company or product?<\/strong><\/span>
                  \nIf the investment doesn\u2019t make sense even after thorough research, it\u2019s best to avoid it.<\/span><\/li>\n
                2. Are the past returns unrealistically high?<\/strong><\/span>
                  \nExtraordinary returns often revert to the mean. Be cautious if it seems too good to be true.<\/span><\/li>\n
                3. Am I following the crowd?<\/strong><\/span>
                  \nAre you drawn to this investment because friends, family, or social media are hyping it up? Social proof can be misleading. Return to Question 1.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                  Questions to Ask the Seller<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

                    \n
                  1. Are you an Insider?<\/strong><\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                    If the proposer is sharing a material non-public information obtained from insider access, strongly avoid and prevent falling foul with insider trading violations.<\/span><\/p>\n

                      \n
                    1. Are you SEBI-registered?<\/strong><\/span>
                      \nIf the seller isn\u2019t registered with SEBI, it\u2019s a clear red flag. Avoid.<\/span><\/li>\n
                    2. What are your incentives?<\/strong><\/span>
                      \nFind out how the seller benefits:<\/span><\/p>\n
                        \n
                      • Are they earning commissions or fees based on your investment or training course purchases?<\/span><\/li>\n
                      • Or are they incentivized by your actual investment gains?<\/span>
                        \nBe sceptical if it\u2019s the former, even if they are your friends or family (especially if they are)<\/span>.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n
                      • Are you personally invested in what you\u2019re selling?<\/strong><\/span>
                        \nRequest for documentary proof of their own investments in the product they are selling. If the seller hasn\u2019t put his\/her own money into the product, it\u2019s a sign they may not believe in its potential.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                        By asking these critical questions, maintaining a healthy scepticism and using calm judgement, you can avoid being taken for a ride and protect your hard-earned money.<\/span><\/p>\n

                        ***<\/span><\/p>\n

                        We welcome two CA industrial trainees \u2013Dhruva Koolwal<\/strong> and Aayush Choudhary<\/strong> to our team. Dhruva is a school topper, holds rank in CA Foundation and is district topper in CA Intermediate exam. He is ex-Grant Thornton. Aayush cleared CA Foundation and Intermediate exams in first attempt mostly through self-study. He is ex-Protivity.<\/span><\/p>\n

                        As always, gratitude for your trust and patience. Kindly do share your thoughts, if any. Your feedback helps us improve our services to you!<\/span><\/p>\n

                        Wishing you a great 2025!<\/span><\/p>\n

                        Kind regards,<\/span><\/p>\n

                        Team Compound Everyday Capital<\/span><\/p>\n

                        Sumit Sarda, Surbhi Kabra Sarda, Punit Patni, Arpit Parmar, Dhruva Koolwal, Aayush Choudhary<\/span><\/p>\n

                        ————————————————————————————————————————————————-<\/span><\/p>\n

                        Disclaimer: Compound Everyday Capital Management LLP is SEBI registered Portfolio Manager with registration number INP 000006633. Past performance is not necessarily indicative of future results. All information provided herein is for informational purposes only and should not be deemed as a recommendation to buy or sell securities. This transmission is confidential and may not be redistributed without the express written consent of Compound Everyday Capital Management LLP and does not constitute an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to purchase any security or investment product. Reference to an index does not imply that the firm will achieve returns, volatility, or other results similar to the index.<\/span><\/p>\n

                        \u00a0<\/u><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

                          EXECUTIVE SUMMARY For the Dec\u201924 quarter, the BSE500 index reported a change of -7.8% including dividends. We reported -0.6%.\u00a0 Trailing twelve months\u2019 earnings of underlying portfolio companies grew by 25%. In an elevated market like current one, falling less might be more important than rising more. Looking at our batting average and equity IRRs. […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[3,9],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1259","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-investment-process","category-quarterly-update"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/cedcapital.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1259","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/cedcapital.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/cedcapital.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cedcapital.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cedcapital.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=1259"}],"version-history":[{"count":18,"href":"https:\/\/cedcapital.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1259\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1278,"href":"https:\/\/cedcapital.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1259\/revisions\/1278"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/cedcapital.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=1259"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cedcapital.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=1259"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cedcapital.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=1259"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}