Underperformance of an Investment Style

 

Practicing a sensible investment style consistently is important for investment performance. There will be periods when a style will be out of favour. And with each year of underperformance, one will wonder if the style works (Warren Buffet in 1998-2000; Prashant Jain in 2015-2019). The tendency to dump the out of favour style and hug the popular style is highest at the time when the out of favour style starts working again (both Warren and Prashant came out on top as cycle reversed).

So if the style makes economic and rational sense, there is need to endure especially when the confidence is low. 

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Five hurdle checklist that reduces risks and improves returns

Surgeons, pilots and many critical professionals have saved lives using checklists. In last 12 years, our investment checklist has evolved after being battle tested with real life wins and losses. Here’s that checklist summarised into five key hurdles/ questions that every company we own or wish to own has to pass:

First and the biggest hurdle is that we must be able to independently understand the business. This involves understanding how the business makes money and why do consumers demand its product/ services. Due to complexity of the business or our own ignorance, many businesses are not able to pass through this screen. No understanding, no conviction, no investment case. Time, reading and thinking help us improve understanding of new or existing businesses.

The second key question that we ask is how large is the opportunity size. A company that is serving an essential product/ service with no threat of substitution and has low penetration can be said to have a long runway (for example demat accounts, air conditioners, health insurance etc). A definite disruption threat is a key risk to avoid.

Long runway, however, in itself is not enough. The business should have some inherent competitive advantage that allows it to tap the runway profitably. Competitive advantage allows the company to protect profits from competition or regulations. Low cost, network effects, patent/ license/ copyright, switching costs, consumer habits, culture etc. can be some of the sources of competitive advantage. Without competitive advantage, growth does not create shareholder value. This is an area where we spend a lot of time. High returns on capital hints presence of an advantage in the past. We probe the causes and durability of such high returns. It is important not to mistake cyclical tailwind/ headwind as competitive advantage/ disadvantage.

The fourth and the most difficult filter is management quality. We look at the past actions of management around three areas. First is execution track record i.e. ability to create distribution, human resource, and supply chain capabilities that allows it to maintain or grow its market share. Second is capital allocation i.e. investing incremental earnings on return accretive projects or in absence, returning them back to shareholders in best possible way. Last is treatment of minority shareholders as evident from accounting quality, embezzlement, remuneration and skin in the game.

The last but important hurdle is valuation. For core equity positions, valuation alone is useless unless the company passes all the four hurdles above. Our preferred method to value is to see what growth and margin assumptions are built into current price versus (a) past and (b) our conservative imagination of its future. Often a company that passes the above four tests does not come cheap. While quality demands paying up, paying any price can be a mistake. We need to wait for temporary hardships or size discount (smaller companies can remain mispriced due to lack of attention from larger investors) that can create mispricings.

Despite failing to pass one or more of the above five hurdles, a company’s stock may do temporarily well. An 80 P/E stock may go to 100P/E; stock of a company in a new long runway sector but no entry barrier may rise in initial euphoria; temporary tailwinds may be mistaken for enduring advantage etc. But if the truth around the five steps hold, weak thesis gets its due punishment. Conversely, a company passing through all the five hurdles sooner or later gets it due reward. Keeping the investing bar high and executing all five of them with discipline and margin of safety is the key to minimise investment mistakes and improve long term returns. Funnily, the five hurdle process eventually works because it does not always work

 

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Preferred Way to Reduce Risk in a Rising Market

 

“Risk means more things can happen than will happen”

-Elroy Dimson

 

In a rising market, most investment/ trading styles do well despite overpaying. For, money gushing into any asset class can raise its price irrespective of underlying value. Prudence and safety are needless, even penalised during such times. But like most good things, such good runs – even if they extend over a long time – eventually reverse. Waking up to build controls after such reversal is too late.

Portfolio safety is like a car’s seat belt. Both are minor irritants in good times, but life-saving during accidents. Just as it is prudent to always wear seat belts tolerating minor discomfort, it is important to control risk in portfolios even in good times tolerating lower relative returns.

Our preferred way to reduce risk in the portfolio is to buy a diversified set of good companies cheaply and hold them till they remain good and don’t get super expensive. Yes, there is an inherent conflict in this goal. Markets have become more efficient and everyone is trying to do the same. So good companies donot come cheap. Mostly. But there are two pockets where mispricings are common. First is temporary hardships either in the world, country, sector or company during which even good companies get traded at throw away prices. And second is smaller companies which are not so well tracked and/ or are less liquid and can remain mispriced.

Doing the above is easy in theory but difficult in practice. We need to exercise discipline and have safety margin in all the three components – (a) diversified uncorrelated positions, (b) good companies, and (c) reasonable valuations.

And while doing the above, there are bouts of luck and mistakes. Many times, probable outcomes don’t happen and/ or improbable outcomes happen. Often we get good outcomes beyond our expectations due to plain good luck. These times call for humility and trimming positions that get super expensive. Conversely despite doing the right thing our positions can fall. If there is no material deterioration in underlying fundamentals, these are times not for despondency or self-pity, but raising our bets. Lastly, we make mistakes; they are normal in a pursuit of higher than risk-free returns. When we make mistakes, mention of their account precedes that of achievements so that we don’t lose the lessons.

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Focus on Intrinsic Value

 

“What do you see, son”? Asked Guru Dronacharya. “Only the bird’s eye, Sir”, replied Arjun.

-the Mahabharat

We all have grown up listening to this Mahabharat  story on importance of focus. Whether its archery or investing, great achievements demand undivided focus. The bird’s eye equivalent in long term investing that demands undivided focus is company’s intrinsic value (or economic worth, in simpler terms). For, only that can help us decide if a company is undervalued or overvalued versus its stock price. Everything else, is noise.

To recall, a company’s intrinsic value is the present value of its future free cash flows. Two broad components of intrinsic value calculation are (1) future free cash flows (i.e. cash earnings less investments) and (2) future interest rates to discount those cashflows to their present values (aka discount rates).

Assessing intrinsic value, thus, requires looking into the future – for both cash flows and discount rates. Unlike Arjun’s bird in the Mahabharat that is still and clearly visible, intrinsic value is therefore a moving and hazy bird.

Future cashflows: Either due to their nature or our current ignorance, we cannot imagine future cash flows of most of the companies. It’s futile to even attempt their intrinsic value calculations. For, in archery parlance, we cannot even see the bird. Nonetheless, there is a sub set of companies where we can. Mostly these companies provide essential, under-penetrated or non-substitutable products/ services competitively and are run by able and honest management. They are expected to see reasonable revenue growth and high returns on capital. Here is where we limit ourselves looking.

Future interest rates: For intrinsic value purposes we are concerned, not with interest rates of next quarter or year, but with long term future interest rates. Just as assuming very low long term future interest rates is mistaken (last 10 years), so is assuming very high long term interest rates (temptation today). We need to assume moderate interest rates over long term in our intrinsic value assessment. Given that 30-yr Indian government securities are yielding around 7% today (2024), 4% is too low, and 15% too high for discount rate. Anywhere between 10%-12% sounds okay, today.

We need to place all incoming information in above backdrop. Discipline to limit ourselves to sound companies and focus on their intrinsic values that correctly embeds future cashflows and long term future interest rates will allow us to ignore noise and take right investment actions.

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7 key learnings from 10 years of Compound Everyday Capital

Journey is the destination

We completed 10 years at Compound Everyday Capital in 2022 and shared seven of our key learnings with our investors:

1. Risk > Return: In our initial days while we thought we were risk conscious, our primary focus was on returns. We didn’t know that we didn’t know. Despite taking risks that we were unaware of, we did well due to luck. The wrong lessons led to mistakes, heartburn and learning. The learning is that risk management and capital protection should be the primary goal of investing. And the simplest way to reduce risk in equity investing is not to overpay after doing proper valuation work that incorporates quality of business and management, uncertainty, cyclicity, possibility of being wrong and base rates. Putting risk first, however, is not as easy as it sounds. For, in a rising market a risk based investment approach will feel like what insurance premium feels until there is an accident – a needless cost. However over the longer term this risk focused approach, like insurance, will avoid large drawdowns and come out better even if it lags in interim.

2. Seek to invalidate: Evolution has ill prepared human mind for investing. Emotions, while good for surviving in the savannah, work counter-productively in investing. In past, ego and confirmation bias had stopped us from rejecting our delusions. We were caught trying to justify low valuations without looking at perils. If we had worked on an idea, it started looking good to our mind -ego. We selectively looked at positives to justify holding – confirmation bias. Bruised ego, we learnt painfully, is better than burnt pockets. Today when we get a new idea, our first reaction is to try to actively kill it. Our initial research focuses on searching for evidences that proves that the bet is subpar and therefore not worth spending more time. Only if we find ourselves unable to actively kill an idea, we move ahead with it but try to remain ready to ditch if thesis doesn’t unfold as we though. Care is needed not to take this too far, for it can foster cynicism and inactivity. It’s a difficult balance to achieve, but we are trying. On balance, this approach has saved us on more occasions than leading us astray.

3. Two key risks – Poor Management, Disrupted Business: We have made a handful of mistakes that tick this box. Management that, in past, has not allocated capital well, not has executed well, has not adopted conservative accounting or has not treated minority investors well are clear red flags. Similarly when we find evidence that a business is definitely disrupted or if the new technology weakens a company’s competitive positioning, we are worried. In both these cases, we avoid/exit irrespective how mouth-watering surface valuations look. They are mostly traps.

4. Temporary hardships are good: Often the type of company that we like – exceptional business run by able and honest management – is what everyone likes as well. This means most of them are well tracked and efficiently priced most of the time. However temporary setbacks in either the company, sector, country or the world engenders fear which breaks their efficient pricing mechanism. These are the only times when exceptional businesses can be found at exceptional prices. Benefitting from temporary hardships requires preparation and waiting. Preparation for understanding the right companies, and waiting for temporary hardships. Caution, however, is needed to ensure that the hardships are indeed temporary and not permanent.

5. Most things are cyclical: In investing, like in life, good times are followed by bad and vice versa. Demand, supply, growth, margins and multiples go through cycles and mean revert. Peak growth, peak margins and peak multiples often occur in life of a company. During such times, FOMO (fear of missing out), accolades, media narratives and halo effect can tempt one to give in and enter at wrong times. Opposite happens when cycle reverses. Awareness of cycles, therefore, is a good way to profit from them.

6. Expanding circle of competence: Doing proper valuation work is the bed rock of risk based investing. We cannot assess whether a company is over or under valued unless we have an opinion about its intrinsic value. Forming this opinion requires good understanding of a company – it’s business model, size of opportunity, competitive position, key drivers etc. It’s usually safe to skip an idea if we cannot understand the business and if it falls outside our circle of competence – which happens often with us. While this discipline is important, what makes our work both engaging and challenging at the same time is the efforts required to expand this circle of competence one company at a time. Larger the circle, larger is the fishing pond.

7. Smart Diversification: All returns lie in the future, but the future is unknowable. Despite best efforts, rapid technological change, uncertainty, ignorance and mistakes will remain investing challenges. Too much concentration can raise risks. To provide for these risks, we need humility in sizing our bets and diversifying intelligently. An intelligently diversified portfolio is one where constituent securities donot always move in one direction and thus lend resilience across multiple adverse scenarios over longer term. Care, conversely, is also needed not to over-diversify else winners will not move the needle.

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Return is visible. Risk is not

Unlike investment return, there are no full proof quantitative measures of investment risk. Risk can only be qualitatively judged. It’s like driving a vehicle. One can choose between safe and rash driving. Driving at 100 kmph can be both rash and safe depending on type of vehicle, road and traffic. Similarly, a 20% return can be both safe and risky depending on the buying price. An expensive buy can get more expensive and generate that 20% return. At the same time a cheaper stock can get reasonably priced and generate 20% return. Former is risky, latter is less so.

Assessment of investment performance is incomplete if the focus is only on returns and not risks. The best way to reduce investment risk is to invest within one’s circle of competence and not to overpay.

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Test match Vs T20 match

10 Overs, 40 runs, 0 wickets. How’s this for a first innings cricket match score? You will rightly ask – What’s the format of this game? It’s a bad score for a twenty-twenty (T20) match, average score for a one day (ODI) match and a decent score for a test match. And if it’s indeed a test match with bouncy pitch, overcast conditions and the best bowling unit in the world – you will say it’s a fantastic score.

In cricket and in investing, it’s impossible and, even, unfair to judge a score without knowing what format of the game it is. What’s good for T20 may be bad for test matches. What’s good for momentum trading may be bad for long term investing.

We are playing a test match and not a T20. The key to success – both in test match batting and long term investing – is to leave or defend the balls that are risky. And, hit only when the ball is in the sweet zone.

This investing sweet zone for us is buying sustainable businesses, run by able and honest management, at reasonable prices. And so long the ball is not in this zone – either the business and/or management and/or price are bad, we wait, and wait and wait. For that juicy half volley or full toss right in our zone. They normally come.

T20s are more popular than test matches. Similarly, short term investment horizon and momentum based trading are more common than long term horizon and value oriented investing. Popular attention is focussed on what’s going to happen next day, week or month in markets. This should not let us forget that we are playing a different game. 

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Temporary Hardships

Good businesses seldom trade at bargain prices.  However some times, very rarely, they are struck by adversity that hurts earnings. In our experience the immediate price reaction to any sudden negative development for good business is mostly negative. If on a calm analysis we can conclude that the hardships are temporary and less impactful than the price has discounted, such bloopers can be a good opportunity to pick good businesses at good prices.

The obvious mistake that can be made is to misjudge permanent hardship as temporary, and structural headwinds as cyclical shifts. The only antidote against making this mistake is a sound understanding of the business and its industry.

MCX fell 84% in 2013 when NSEL fiasco came to light. Muthoot Finance fell 63% in 2013 after gold prices fell 20% and RBI imposed 60% LTV requirement. Inox Leisure fell 36% in 2018 when a PIL was filed to allow outside food. Canfin Homes fell 65% in 2018 after Canara Bank failed to sell its 30% stake at its desired price and IL&FS default further affected sentiments towards non-bank lenders. These were temporary hardships where we remained invested and/or added further and have been rewarded well.

Dish TV fell 80% due to Jio aggression and OTT popularity. DB Corp too fell 80% despite high cash generation and growing in circulation due to threat from internet. These are permanent hardships and we had to exit at par in former and loss in latter.

So long as demand continues to remain robust, business debt free or has access to capital, raw material or end product prices are cyclical, and remedial measures remain in control of management, the hardships are temporary.

However if there is challenge to long term sustainability of demand, or new technology brings in better and/or cheaper solutions hardships are permanent.

Curiously temporary hardships have higher visibility, permanent hardships are less noisy. Management and media miss the latter or hope it to be temporary. Nonetheless, ability to distinguish between the two can be profitable. Wherever prices misjudge the hardship to be permanent, it can be a good buying opportunity.

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Behaviour as an edge

“What’s not going to change in next 10 years?”

-Jeff Bezos

Internet, AI, securities regulations and entry of talented individuals have blunted the erstwhile investment edge offered by better information and better analyses. Rational behaviour – buying below intrinsic value and selling above it irrespective of short term noise – still remains a sustainable source of investment edge. That’s because institutional compulsions and human emotions & biases force participants to eschew this rationality and create mispricing. These two factors will not materially change in next 10 years. 

Institutional Compulsion: Investment behaviour of fund managers at investment institutions is driven by minimising career risk. Their jobs, promotions and bonuses depend on increasing the assets under management (AUM) which in turn depends on matching or beating their benchmarks net of fees on quarterly basis. Often unconventional and/ or concentrated stock picks cannot offer this guarantee. Therefore most of them construct ‘index aware’ portfolios – euphemism for mimicking benchmark indices. Many companies that are out of index donot find buyers and remain mispriced. Rising interest in Index Funds/ETFs (passive funds that mimic benchmarks fully without any human discretion) will further aggravate this anomaly. Further, redemptions or regulations force fund managers to sell stocks irrespective of value. In past SEBI reclassification in mutual funds drove lot of money out of mid and small caps to large caps irrespective of fundamental merit. 

Human emotions & biases: While good for hunting, gathering and surviving, evolution has ill prepared us to do well in investing. Fear and greed were mental shortcuts that helped our hunter forefathers survive. They ran when there were rustlings in the bushes (fear). And, they overate/ stored whenever food was in excess (greed). These genes are passed on to us as their legacy. Price fall triggers the same fear. Risk aversion rises and future projections get grim. No price is too low. Conversely price rise engenders same greed. Risk taking rises and future projections get rosy. No price is too high. Behavioural Finance has demonstrated that we are not perfectly rational. We are susceptible to heuristics and cognitive biases.

Behaviour Edge: Knowing above, following offers us a sustainable investment edge:

  1. Operating only in businesses that we honestly understand and having a sense of their intrinsic values.
  2. Remaining humbly aware of multiple possibilities including our folly and therefore buying with a margin of safety.
  3. Understanding that (a) intrinsic values are less volatile than price, and (b) emotions revert to mean.
  4. Raising money and/ or investing only when prices make sense (is harder than seems) and willingness to hold cash when opportunities are thin. Our incentive structure supports this behaviour.

Rational Money: A fund’s behaviour is derived from its investors’ behaviour. We may, thanks to above reasons, find bargain securities and buy. Prices however may continue to fall even after that despite fundamentals remaining intact. Interim NAV performance may look poor. If investors panic and withdraw on those times, the paper loss will be converted to actual loss and all our behavioural astuteness will amount to nothing. A fund manager can be only as rational as the money she manages.

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Humility & Conviction

Psychology plays an important role in investing. A crucial component of investment psychology is the delicate balance between humility and conviction. In investing, we deal with future. Assessment of future outcomes and their probabilities requires humility – acknowledgment of the fact that we may not know everything and what we know may turn out to be wrong.  Just humility will, however, lead to nowhere. Even after factoring in the possibilities of being ignorant and wrong, if Mr. Market provides an opportunity, we got to be ready to act with conviction.

The importance of this delicate balance between humility and conviction should shape one’s investment behavior.

Humility translates into various aspects of investment process namely – conservative assessment of value, investing with a margin of safety, diversifying, willingness to hold cash and sit tight when opportunities abate. To gain conviction, one needs to understand the underlying business, have a long term orientation and bet strongly when odds are in favour.

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